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(E)Racing Trayvon Martin 
 
 
Cynthia Lee* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of Critical Race Theory [CRT], we have much to 
celebrate and much work ahead.  In its early years, Critical Race Theory was a much-criticized and 
denigrated body of scholarship.  By and large, critical race scholars were law professors of color 
writing about issues of racial subordination and injustice.  Their work was criticized as 
insufficiently rigorous.1  The use of narrative or storytelling, a prominent feature of much CRT 
scholarship, was criticized as well.2  Many junior law professors of color were warned by more 
senior professors of color not to write about race before acquiring tenure as doing so might 
negatively affect their chances of getting tenure.3 
Today, CRT, while still viewed negatively by many, has become a much more respected mode 
of scholarship.  Many law schools today offer courses on Critical Race Theory or Race, Racism, 
and the Law.  Law professors teaching courses on legal theory and jurisprudence often include a 
CRT component in their syllabi.  There are several CRT casebooks on the market, so a professor 
teaching CRT does not have to cobble together her own materials.4  CRT scholars are amongst the 
most widely cited in the profession.5 
While CRT has come a long way from the days when it was widely disrespected, much work 
still needs to be done to address the problems of racial subordination that concern critical race 
scholars, particularly in the criminal justice arena.  Our prisons are still filled with Black and Brown 
*   Cynthia Lee is the Charles Kennedy Poe Research Professor of Law at The George Washington University 
Law School.  I thank Devon Carbado and Camille Gear Rich for reading a draft of this essay and providing helpful 
commentary.  I also thank Matthew Halldorson and Masako Yoshioka for excellent research assistance on this article. 
1   See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1989); 
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 
(1997); Daniel Subotnik, What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory?: Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681 (1998). 
2   Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 807, 814–19, 835–42 (1993); Subotnik, supra note 1, at 687–91. 
3   Richard Delgado recounts his experience as a junior professor of color being “told by a number of well-meaning 
senior colleagues to . . . establish a reputation as a scholar in some mainstream legal area and not get too caught up in 
civil rights or other ‘ethnic’ subjects,” a story familiar to many professors of color concerned about racial justice issues.  
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561 
(1984).  When I was an untenured professor, I was warned by my more senior colleagues—colleagues who wanted to 
see me succeed and get tenure—that it would be risky for me to write about race.  I was told that one of my other 
colleagues of color had co-authored a paper when she was pre-tenure that had “Critical Race Theory” in the title, and had 
gotten flak for doing this from senior colleagues who were hostile to writings about race. 
4   See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012); JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES, CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A 
DIVERSE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007); GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL, RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: 1607 TO PRESENT 
(2007). 
5   See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of all Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1483, 1489–93 (2012) (noting that critical race theorists such as Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, 
Angela Harris, Neil Gotanda, and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw are some of the most widely cited legal scholars); Fred 
R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424–26 (2000) (noting that critical race theorists 
such as Richard Delgado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Angela Harris are some of the most widely cited legal 
scholars); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 751 (1996) (noting 
that a high percentage of the most widely cited articles are written by critical race theorists). 
                                                     
inmates.6  “More than 60% of the people in prison are racial and ethnic minorities,” and one out of 
every ten Black men in their 30s is incarcerated on any given day.7  These numbers are largely due 
to socio-economic conditions that encourage criminal behavior, but are also partly due to media 
focus on Black and Brown men caught up in the criminal justice system, marking them as more 
vulnerable to police stops and arrests.8 
In addition to the problem of racial disparity in mass incarceration, another area of concern is 
the differential treatment of capital defendants, which often turns on the race of the victim.  This 
problem was highlighted in the Baldus study, referenced in the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
McCleskey v. Kemp.9  David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth examined over 
2,000 capital murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.10  They found that defendants 
charged with killing White victims received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants 
charged with killing Black victims received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases.11  They also 
found that jurors imposed the death penalty in 22% of the cases involving Black defendants and 
White victims, but only 3% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims, and 1% of 
the cases involving Black defendants and Black victims.12  The Baldus study also found that 
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving Black defendants and White 
victims, but did the same in only 19% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims.13  
The race of the victim continues to play a prominent role in capital cases today.14  The race of the 
defendant affects jury verdicts as well, with jurors treating Black defendants much more punitively 
than similarly situated White defendants.15 
The persistence of racial disparity in the treatment of defendants charged with interracial 
crimes of violence is perplexing in light of the egalitarian attitudes most Americans embrace today.  
Social science research on implicit social cognition suggests one reason for this seeming 
inconsistency between the positive egalitarian attitudes most Americans embrace and the 
differential treatment of Black and White defendants charged with interracial crimes of violence.  
6   I purposely capitalize the letter “B” in “Black” and “W” in “White” to acknowledge the fact that Black and 
White are socially constructed racial categories.  
7   Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2014) (“For Black males in their thirties, 1 in every 10 is in prison or jail on any given day.”).  
8   NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME 
AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 20–23 (Sept. 3, 2014) available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Race_and_Punishment.pdf. 
9   481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).  
10  Id.; see generally David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death 
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 680 (1983); David C. 
Baldus, George Woodworth, & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing 
Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1399–1406 (1985). 
11  McClesky, 481 U.S. at 286. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 287. 
14  See Race and the Death Penalty, ACLU (Feb. 26, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/race-and-
death-penalty (finding that 80 percent of all capital cases involve White victims); Catherine M. Grosso et al., Race 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 525–76 (James R. 
Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed.) (noting that twenty-four of thirty-six empirical studies of death 
penalty systems published after 1990 found race of victim effects).  
15  See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., NEBRASKA COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE 
DISPOSITION OF NEBRASKA CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES (1973–1999): A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 108 (2001) (finding that minority offenders were more likely than non-minority offenders to receive more 
punitive treatment); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142 (2012); Grosso et 
al., supra note 14 (noting that 9 of 36 empirical studies of death penalty systems published after 1990 found race-of-
defendant effects).  
                                                     
While most Americans think it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race, they are nevertheless 
affected by negative racial stereotypes about Blacks.16  These stereotypes link Blacks with danger, 
violence, criminality, laziness, welfare, and incompetence, and encourage implicit racial bias in 
favor of Whites over Blacks.17  Implicit racial bias is often inversely correlated with our explicit 
beliefs about race.  We may firmly believe that people should be treated equally without regard to 
their race or ethnicity, but cannot help thinking about crime, violence, or gangs when we see a 
Black individual.18  Even if an individual knows that it is improper to stereotype, she may not be 
able to keep from automatically doing so.19 
Another less obvious reason for the intransigence of racial bias is our adherence to the ideal 
of colorblindness.  Many, possibly most, people in the United States today believe it is good to be 
colorblind—to not see racial difference—out of a belief that recognizing racial difference leads to 
discrimination on the basis of race.20  The problem is that ignoring racial difference can actually 
exacerbate the effects of implicit racial bias.  It is when we are not paying attention to race that we 
are most vulnerable to racial stereotyping.  Recent social science research suggests a practical 
solution to the problem of implicit racial bias: we can minimize the effects of racial stereotypes not 
by ignoring, but by paying more attention to race.21 
In Part One of this essay, I will examine one of the most powerful critical race critiques in the 
criminal justice arena, Devon Carbado’s law review article, “(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment,” 
which was published over a decade ago in the Michigan Law Review in 2002.22  In this article, 
Carbado leveled a general critique on the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth 
Amendment.  He also leveled a more specific critique of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s colorblind ideology as manifested in her opinion for the Court in Florida v. Bostick.23  
16  See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). 
17  See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, YOUNG MEN OF COLOR IN THE MEDIA: IMAGES AND IMPACTS, JOINT CENTER FOR 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES BACKGROUND PAPER 13 (2006); Adeno Addis, “Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:” The 
Mass Media, Law, and African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523, 555 (1993) (“The image of young black males conveyed 
by the mainstream media is one associated with drugs, crime, and violence.”); Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, the 
O.J. Simpson Trials, and Storytelling to Juries, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 549, 550 (1997) (“[T]he image of young 
violent Black men is very prevalent in the media.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White 
Fears—On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503, 512 (1994) (noting that Blacks are often depicted as 
“violent muggers and burglars”). 
18  See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004).  See also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 138–46 (NYU Press 2003) 
(explaining in detail the “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a 
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402–23 (1996) (examining stereotypes about African 
Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans). 
19  See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 
(2013). 
20  See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009). 
21  See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and 
Juries?  A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003) (finding that presenting 
jurors with race relevant voir dire questions in cases involving interracial violence reduced racial bias in White jurors); 
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000) (finding that in interracial domestic violence cases, White jurors 
were more likely to treat White and Black defendants the same if the defendant referred to himself as a White or Black 
man when speaking to his girlfriend than if he simply referred to himself as a man); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599 (2009) (summarizing authors’ previous research on race salience); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 202 (2001) (noting that “racial norms in society have shifted dramatically”). 
22  Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002). 
23  501 U.S. 429 (1991).   
                                                     
In Part Two, I fast forward to 2013 and draw parallels between Carbado’s critique of the colorblind 
ideology apparent in the Bostick decision and my own critique of the colorblind handling of the 
July 2013 trial of George Zimmerman in the shooting death of Trayvon Martin. 
This essay broadens Carbado’s analysis in at least two ways.  First, whereas Carbado examined 
the Fourth Amendment as a site for racial construction, my commentary focuses on race 
construction in the doctrine of self-defense.  The Fourth Amendment and the defense of self-
defense are two doctrinal sites that most people think have little in common.  Both doctrines, 
however, are connected by reasonableness requirements that enable beliefs and attitudes about race 
to influence outcomes.  Second, while Carbado’s critique focused on the Supreme Court as a site 
where race is constructed, my critique draws attention to the dynamics of race outside the Supreme 
Court context.  Most legal scholarship focuses on Supreme Court cases.  My analysis, in contrast, 
calls attention to the ways in which race is constructed by other actors in the legal system, including 
the trial judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the jury.  I offer a common-sense solution 
to the intransigent problem of racial bias: calling attention to race to encourage jurors to consciously 
combat stereotypical thinking. 
 
I. (E)RACING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
In (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, Devon Carbado leveled three basic critiques at the then 
existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment.  First, Carbado lamented that the existing 
scholarship failed to examine the nexus between the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
and ideological notions of what race is and what race should be.24  The heart of the problem, 
according to Carbado, was that the existing scholarship failed to engage with CRT, and thus failed 
to recognize the role that courts play in constructing racial ideologies and legitimizing racial 
inequality.25 
Second, Carbado noted that the existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment failed 
to fully examine the ways in which Fourth Amendment doctrine affected the everyday lives of 
persons of color.26  In particular, Carbado noted that the existing scholarship failed to recognize 
that people of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of performances for the police.27  
These performances include ultra-deferential acts motivated by fear of police violence.28  Since 
many of the U.S. Supreme Court's tests in the Fourth Amendment arena turn on what the reasonable 
person would have felt or believed, ignoring racial difference can lead lower courts to draw 
conclusions that may not reflect the lived realities of many Black individuals.  For example, the 
test for a “seizure” of the person is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.29  A 
reasonable Black man who has been stopped and harassed by police in the past might not feel free 
to leave when approached by police officers who start asking questions.  If the race of the defendant 
is not taken into account, however, the decision-maker may decide that a reasonable person 
(understood as the average White middle class individual who has never had a negative experience 
with the police) would have felt free to leave. 
Third, Carbado argued that the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment 
was under-inclusive, focusing mostly on Blacks and ignoring the fact that race-based policing is a 
multi-racial phenomenon.30  Latinos, Asian Americans, and other racial and ethnic minorities are 
24  Carbado, supra note 22, at 965. 
25  Id at 965–66. 
26  Id. at 966.   
27  Id. (“Few people have noted that people of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of 
performances for the police.”). 
28  Id. (“The burden includes, but is not limited to, internalized racial obedience toward, and fear of, the police.”). 
29  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
30  Carbado, supra note 22, at 967. 
                                                     
also the victims of racial profiling by police.  Importantly, Carbado pointed out that it is easier to 
ignore problems of policing if these problems are seen as practices affecting just Black people.31  
Drawing attention to the ways in which police activity affects people of all races can help bring 
about reform more easily than narrowly focusing on problems faced by Blacks alone.32 
Carbado’s project was to address these deficiencies by examining Fourth Amendment case 
law as a jurisprudential site where the Supreme Court engages in the production of race.33  The 
Supreme Court, according to Carbado, constructs race by providing a particular conception of what 
race is.34  The Court, Carbado argued, “conceptualizes race primarily through the racial lens of 
colorblindness.”35  While perhaps motivated by good intentions, the Court’s colorblind ideology 
results in persons of color being under-protected and over-policed.36  In other words, the Fourth 
Amendment is erased for people of color, hence the title of Carbado’s article.37  Carbado analyzed 
several Fourth Amendment cases to demonstrate his claims.  In this essay, I focus on Carbado’s 
critique of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s colorblind ideology as reflected in Florida v. Bostick.38 
In Florida v. Bostick, two Broward County Sheriff’s Department officers boarded a bus, which 
had made a temporary stop in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.39  Without any particularized or articulable 
reason to believe Terrance Bostick was involved in criminal activity, the officers approached 
Bostick and asked to see his bus ticket and identification.40  Bostick complied.41  The officers then 
asked Bostick if they could search his luggage.42  There is some dispute over whether Bostick 
consented.43  Regardless, the officers searched Bostick’s luggage and, after finding contraband 
within, arrested Bostick and charged him with trafficking in cocaine.44 
While the Bostick Court refrained from definitively deciding whether Bostick had been 
“seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,45 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
made clear the Court’s skepticism that any such seizure had occurred, writing, “The facts of this 
case, as described by the Florida Supreme Court, leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred.”46  
If Bostick was not seized, as the Court intimated, this would mean that there was no violation of 
Bostick’s Fourth Amendment rights since the Fourth Amendment only applies when the 
government searches or seizes persons or property.  
The suggestion that Bostick was not seized was surprising because the average bus passenger 
most likely would not feel free to leave if confronted by law enforcement officers conducting an 
31  Id. at 967.  
32  Some have suggested that the reason why the ACLU’s lawsuit against the New York City Police Department 
for its Terry stop and frisk policy and practice of racial profiling drew so much sympathy for the plaintiffs was because 
it highlighted a broad swath of unjustified stops and frisks involving Latinos as well as African Americans, and most 
Americans could see themselves in the shoes of the person who was stopped and frisked. Miriam Gohara, Senior 
Attorney, Federal Capital Habeas Project, New Haven, CT, Panel Discussion, Stop and Frisk as a Policing Tactic: The 
Situation Post-Floyd, AALS Annual Meeting, New York, NY (Jan. 3, 2014).  
33  Carbado, supra note 22, at 967. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 968 & n.109. 
36  Id. at 969. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 975–90. 
39  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991). 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 432. 
43  Id. 
44  Id.  
45  Id. at 437. 
46  Id.  
                                                     
investigative sweep of the bus for narcotics.  As Janice Nadler explains, a police officer has no need 
to shout in order for his request for permission to search to be perceived as a command by the 
person he has stopped.47  Prior to deciding Florida v. Bostick, the Court had established a “free to 
leave” test for determining whether an individual has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.48  Under this test, a person is “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes if a reasonable 
person in his shoes would not have felt free to leave.49  The Bostick Court, however, modified the 
“free to leave” test, establishing that in cases where factors not attributable to the police contribute 
to an individual’s feeling that he is not free to leave, the test for a seizure of the person is “whether 
a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.”50  If a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or terminate 
the encounter, then no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.  In 
Bostick, a factor not attributable to the police—the fact that the bus could depart with the 
passenger’s luggage—might cause the average bus passenger to feel that he was not free to leave 
the bus.51  Thus, the appropriate inquiry, according to the Bostick Court, was whether a reasonable 
person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free to decline the officer’s request or terminate the 
encounter with the police, not whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.52 
Carbado notes that in her opinion, Justice O’Connor never mentions the fact that Bostick is 
Black; nor does she note on the race of the officers. 53  Carbado suggests that to say Justice 
O’Connor ignores race is only partially correct.54  To Carbado, “it is more accurate to say that 
[Justice O’Connor’s] analysis constructs Bostick and the officers with the racial ideology of 
colorblindness.”55  As Carbado explains, “[T]he problem is not that Justice O’Connor does not see 
race, but rather that she sees race in a particular way.”56  The reason Justice O’Connor does not 
mention race is because she thinks race does not matter.57  The race of Bostick and the officers is 
irrelevant to Justice O’Connor.58   
The decision to construct race as irrelevant is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s race 
jurisprudence in other contexts.  In her Due Process jurisprudence, Justice O’Connor has opined 
that racial classifications of any sort are bad, even when intended to remedy past discrimination 
against racial minorities.59   
Carbado points out that seeing race as irrelevant is not a race neutral position as many might 
think.  Not mentioning race conveys a particular message about race.  Carbado explains:  
 
Describing Bostick as black is no more racially conscious than describing him as a man.  
Both descriptions send a particular message about race.  In the former, that race is 
relevant.  In the latter, it is not.  In both instances, attention is being paid to race.  Neither 
description is race neutral.60 
47  Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 180. 
48  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). 
49  Id. at 554.  
50  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 447. 
53  Carbado, supra note 22, at 977. 
54  Id. at 977–78. 
55  Id. at 978. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 979. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at 980 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)). 
60  Id. at 979. 
                                                     
 
In other words, we explicitly invoke race when we think race is or should be relevant.61  We 
don’t mention race when we think race is or should be irrelevant. 
Carbado recognizes that Justice O’Connor’s decision to ignore race was likely motivated by 
good intentions: “From Justice O’Connor’s perspective, textually referencing [Bostick and the 
officers’] respective racial identities would entrench existing negative racial impressions of—that 
is, stigmatize—both.”62  Justice O’Connor may have feared that racially identifying Bostick as a 
Black man would invoke the stereotype of the Black man as criminal and racially identifying the 
officers as white would invoke the stereotype of the White racist cop.63  To prevent negative 
stereotypes from having any effect, she chose to speak about Bostick and the officers as simply 
individuals without reference to race.64   
The problem, according to Carbado, is that representing Bostick and the officers as race-less 
denied the social reality these individuals faced.65  Bostick was in fact Black and the officers were 
in fact White,66 but under Justice O’Connor’s redefinition, Bostick became “a black man without 
the presumption of criminality and the police [became] white officers without the presumption of 
a racist identity.”67  The problem is that “Bostick may have held and acted on a racial presumption 
that the police officers were racists and the police may have held and acted on a racial presumption 
that Bostick was a criminal.” 68  Indeed, as Carbado notes, “Most, if not all, black people—
especially black men—are apprehensive about police encounters.” 69   African Americans are 
accustomed to hearing about and experiencing police abuse first-hand.70  When a Black man is 
approached by a police officer, he may reasonably fear being beaten (as Rodney King was beaten 
by Los Angeles police officers who felt he was a threat to them when he was lying prone on the 
ground trying to comply with their orders)71 or shot (as Amadou Diallo was when attempting to 
show his ID to plainclothes NYPD officers who erroneously thought the West African immigrant 
was a rape suspect reaching for a gun)72 if he does not comply with the officer’s every request.  
Thus, when Bostick was confronted by the Broward County law enforcement officers, it is likely 
that he did not feel free to leave, terminate the encounter, or decline the officers’ requests for 
identification and consent to search, and it is likely that the average Black man in Bostick’s shoes 
would have felt the same way.73  Under either the traditional test for a seizure of the person or the 
modified test enunciated in Bostick, one should conclude that Bostick was “seized” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The social reality just described, however, is obscured if we 
61  Id. at 980. 
62  Id. at 981. 
63  Id.  
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 981–82. 
66  Id. at 982. 
67  Id. 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 985. 
70  Id. 
71  See Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN (Mar. 3, 2011, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/03/03/rodney.king.20.years.later/; see also Rodney King, BIOGRAPHY., 
http://www.biography.com/people/rodney-king-9542141 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
72  Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; Four Officers in Diallo Shooting are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-
are-acquitted-all-charges.html. 
73  For this reason, Tracey Maclin argues that the race of the defendant should be taken into account as part of the 
totality of the circumstances when a court assesses reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context.  Tracey Maclin, 
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 360 (1998). 
                                                     
ignore the fact that Bostick was Black and the officers were White.  Ignoring race allows one to 
conclude that the reasonable person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free to decline the officers’ 
requests and therefore Bostick was not seized.  Colorblindness can thus result in less racial justice 
for Black men who are detained by White law enforcement officers. 
 
II. (E)RACING TRAYVON MARTIN’S RACE FROM THE ZIMMERMAN TRIAL 
 
Fast forward to July 2013 when George Zimmerman was tried for murder in the shooting death 
of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida.74  Zimmerman, the neighborhood watch captain for his 
neighborhood,75 was out in his truck one rainy evening when he spotted Trayvon Martin, a young 
Black male in a hoodie sweatshirt, who was walking and talking on his cell phone after going to 
the store to get a bag of skittles and a can of Arizona watermelon drink.76  Even though Martin was 
doing nothing to objectively indicate criminal behavior, at least nothing that Zimmerman 
articulated at that time or more than a year later at his trial, Zimmerman thought Martin looked 
suspicious and called 911 to report his suspicions.77  When Martin noticed Zimmerman following 
him, he started walking quickly away.78  Zimmerman got out of his car and followed Martin.79  
Apparently, words were exchanged, and a physical confrontation ensued, ending when Zimmerman 
shot Martin in the chest.80   
Zimmerman remained on the scene after the shooting and told police he shot Martin in self-
defense.81  Zimmerman claimed that after exchanging words with Martin, as he was walking back 
to his car, Martin sneaked back to confront Zimmerman and punched him in the face.82  According 
to Zimmerman, Martin threw him to the ground and slammed his head against the concrete several 
74  For commentary about the shooting, see Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias 
in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); Valena Elizabeth Beety, What the Brain Saw: The Case 
of Trayvon Martin and the Need for Eyewitness Identification Reform, 90 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 331 (2012); Tamara F. 
Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the 
Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (2012); L. Song Richardson 
& Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2012); Josephine Ross, The 
Supreme Court’s Invisible Hand in George Zimmerman’s Trial for the Murder of Trayvon Martin, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-
AM. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with author).  
75  Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race, and Outrage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1; Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012, 
5:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting-zimmerman-
idUSBRE83O18H20120425.  
76  Barry et al., supra note 75; Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 
2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/.  Although the drink that Martin 
was carrying was widely reported by the media as an Arizona iced tea, the drink was actually a can of Arizona watermelon 
drink.  LISA BLOOM, SUSPICION NATION: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN INJUSTICE AND WHY WE CONTINUE 
TO REPEAT IT 49 (2014) (noting that the Arizona watermelon drink Martin was carrying is “often mistakenly referred to 
as an iced tea because the police logged it incorrectly in their crime scene records”); Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, 
Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all. 
77  Barry et al., supra note 75, at A12 (noting that when Zimmerman called 911, he said, “Hey, we’ve had some 
break-ins in my neighborhood . . . [and] there’s a real suspicious guy”).   
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Sari Horwitz, Zimmerman Claims Martin Started Confrontation, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2012, at A2. 
81  See Jason Hanna, Sanford, Florida, Police Answer Questions About Teen’s Shooting Death, CNN (Mar. 21, 
2012, 1:50 PM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/21/sanford-florida-police-answer-questions-about-teens-shooting-
death/. 
82  Id.  See also Frances Robles & Mark Caputo, Tapes Show Sanford Police Grew Skeptical of Zimmerman’s 
Story, MIAMI HERALD, (June 21, 2012) http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/21/2860569/zimmerman-told-police-
trayvon.html. 
                                                     
times.83  Zimmerman told police he shot Martin only after Martin pinned him to the ground, called 
him a mother f---er, said he was going to die that night, and reached for Zimmerman’s gun.84 
Even though the detectives who initially interviewed Zimmerman thought Zimmerman should 
be arrested on suspicion of manslaughter, the Florida State Attorney’s Office instructed the police 
not to arrest Zimmerman.85  When word got out that Zimmerman was released without arrest after 
shooting the unarmed teenager, thousands took to the streets to protest what was widely perceived 
as a racially biased decision not to prosecute.86  The public protests led the Florida State Attorney’s 
Office to reverse its initial decision not to charge Zimmerman with any crime.87  The State of 
Florida ultimately charged Zimmerman with second-degree murder,88 and his trial began in June 
of 2013.89 
 
A. The Role of the Zimmerman Trial Court in Constructing Race as Irrelevant 
 
While race was clearly a focus of the public protests and media commentary about the case in 
2012 after the shooting, race was conspicuously absent from the trial proceedings a little over a 
year later.90  In an early ruling, Judge Debra Nelson, who presided over Zimmerman’s murder trial, 
made it clear to both sides that she intended to run a colorblind trial and did not want either side to 
call attention to race.  In response to a defense motion to preclude the prosecution from referring 
to Zimmerman’s activities as “racial profiling,” Judge Nelson ruled that prosecutors could not use 
the term “racial profiling” when referring to Zimmerman’s activities the night of the shooting.91  
Judge Nelson’s ruling may have been motivated by a desire to strike a balance between what the 
defense wanted (no reference to either “racial profiling” or “profiling”) and what the prosecution 
wanted (the ability to use both terms).  Whatever the motivation, Judge Nelson’s ruling 
83  See David K. Li, Zimmerman Tells Cops Trayvon Martin Reached for His Gun as Police Tapes Released, N.Y. 
POST (June 21, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.nypost.com/f/news/national/zimmerman_tells_cops_trayvon_martin_McSJd59PkDJfTcZP3CYVzH#axzz2
IlVK6rmY. 
84  Id.  Lisa Bloom questions Zimmerman’s account.  She points out that Zimmerman’s gun was holstered in the 
back of his pants, so if Zimmerman was on the ground with Martin on top of him, Martin could not have seen 
Zimmerman’s gun.  See BLOOM, supra note 76, at 60. 
85  Matt Gutman, Trayvon Martin Investigator Wanted Manslaughter Charge, ABC NEWS (Mar, 27, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-investigator-wanted-charge-george-zimmerman-
manslaughter/story?id=16011674#.T3NhR811P6K.  See also Madison Gray, Report: Police Initially Wanted to Make 
Arrest in Trayvon Martin Case, TIME (Mar. 29, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/29/report-police-initially-
wanted-to-make-arrest-in-trayvon-martin-case/ (noting that police investigators did not believe Zimmerman’s story and 
wanted to arrest him on the night of the shooting, but State Attorney Norm Wolfram refused to authorize an arrest). 
86  NAACP Leads March on Sanford, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2012, at A3 (reporting that thousands joined a march 
through Sanford demanding that Zimmerman be arrested); Ovetta Wiggins, A Rallying Cry for Justice in Teen’s Death, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2012, at A3 (reporting that thousands have demonstrated in major cities across the country wearing 
hoodies to show solidarity with Martin, who was wearing a hoodie the night he was killed). 
87  See Madison Gray, Trayvon Martin Case: George Zimmerman Charged with Second-Degree Murder, TIME 
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/04/11/trayvon-martin-case-george-zimmerman-charged-with-second-
degree-murder/.  
88  Sari Horwitz, Charge Filed in Martin Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1; Matt Gutman et al., George 
Zimmerman Case: Should Charges Be Dropped?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-
zimmerman-case-charges-dropped/print?id=16392466. 
89  Lizette Alvarez, Clash of Styles in Court Opens Trial in Trayvon Martin’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/zimmerman-trial.html?_r=0. 
90  See Cynthia Lee, Denying the Significance of Race: Colorblindness and the Zimmerman Trial, in TRAYVON 
MARTIN, RACE, AND “AMERICAN JUSTICE”: WRITING WRONG (Kenneth J. Fasching-Varner et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2014). 
91  Manuel Roig-Franzia, Race is Playing Minor Part in Zimmerman Prosecution, WASH. POST, July 3, 2013, at 
A1 (noting that the role of race in the Zimmerman trial was limited early on by Judge Debra Nelson when she ruled that 
prosecutors could not say that Zimmerman “racially profiled” Martin).   
                                                     
significantly curtailed the government’s ability to discuss the racial implications of Zimmerman’s 
initial decision to follow and his subsequent decision to shoot Martin.92  Just as Justice O’Connor 
constructed race as irrelevant in Florida v. Bostick by ignoring the racial identities of Bostick and 
the law enforcement officers who confronted him, Judge Nelson constructed race as irrelevant in 
the Zimmerman trial by barring the prosecution from referencing the fact that Martin’s race may 
have played a role in triggering Zimmerman’s initial suspicions and his subsequent actions.  Jurors 
were encouraged to view Zimmerman and Martin as simply individuals—or, more accurately, as 
simply men—without regard to their racial identity.   
Race, however, was closely connected to the events that transpired the night Zimmerman 
fatally shot Martin.  Just as Terrance Bostick’s racial identity as a Black man likely influenced the 
way he perceived the White officers who confronted him on the bus as well as the way they 
perceived him, Trayvon Martin’s identity as a young Black male likely influenced the way 
Zimmerman perceived Martin and the way Martin perceived Zimmerman.  Zimmerman didn't see 
a raceless and genderless person walking in his neighborhood.  He saw a young Black male in a 
hoodie, and thought Martin was suspicious most likely because our society associates young, Black, 
and male with crime. 93   The rash of burglaries and attempted break-ins of homes in the 
neighborhood by young Black males in the weeks preceding the shooting only strengthened the 
association Zimmerman made between young Black men and crime.94 
Zimmerman’s racial identity was also significant.  Martin saw a heavy-set, light-skinned man, 
and may have assumed that Zimmerman was White.95 This man was suggesting that Martin had no 
right to be walking in the neighborhood, which likely rubbed Martin the wrong way.  In the pre-
92  Michael Muskal, Judge in Zimmerman Trial Limits Racial References, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2013, at A12 
(noting that Judge Debra Nelson ruled just before opening statements that prosecutors could use words like “vigilante” 
and “profile,” but could not tell jurors that Zimmerman racially profiled Martin); Lisa Lucas & Corky Siemaszko, George 
Zimmerman’s Trayvon Martin Murder Trial Will Not Open with Discussion of Race, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2013, 
11:04 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/trayvon-martin-trial-won-open-race-article-1.1378952 (noting 
that Judge Debra Nelson would not permit prosecutors to say that Zimmerman “racially” profiled Martin). 
93  See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 
(2003) (explaining the Black-as-Criminal stereotype).  Many, if not most, people would have made the same or similar 
assumptions, although they probably would not have acted upon those assumptions as Zimmerman did nor admit to 
making such assumptions in public.  Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban received a huge amount of criticism when he 
spoke candidly about race, bigotry and fear during an interview about former Clippers owner Donald Sterling’s comments 
to his personal assistant, V. Stiviano, asking her not to bring African Americans to Clippers’ home games.  Dan Devine, 
Mavericks Owner Mark Cuban on Race and Bigotry: ‘We’re All Prejudiced in One Way or the Other,’ YAHOO! (May 
22, 2014 11:39 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com.blogs/nba-ball-dont-lie/mavericks-owner-mark-cuban-on-race-and-
bigotry--we’re-all-prejudiced-in-one-way-or-the-other-153950475.html.  Cuban received criticism for saying, “If I see a 
black kid in a hoodie and it’s late at night, I’m walking to the other side of the street.”  Id. 
94  See Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:20 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting-zimmerman-idUSBRE83O18H20120425 (reporting 
that one Black woman who lived in the neighborhood told him, “‘I’m black, OK?’ . . .  ‘There were black boys robbing 
houses in this neighborhood,’ . . .  ‘That’s why George was suspicious of Trayvon Martin’”). 
95  Although Zimmerman is mix-raced, see infra, Martin may have thought Zimmerman was White given his 
complexion.  On how Zimmerman’s race could be read, see Suzanne Gamboa, Trayvon Martin Case: George 
Zimmerman’s Race is a Complicated Matter, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2012, 7:16 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/29/trayvon-martin-case-georg_n_1387711.html (describing the confusion 
about Zimmerman’s race and noting that responding police described Zimmerman as white).  Initial media reports 
referred to Zimmerman as a White man.  See, e.g., Mike Schneider, Family Wants Answers in Fla. Teen’s Death, YAHOO! 
(Mar. 8, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/family-wants-answers-fla-teens-death-162019527.html (“The 
neighborhood watch leader is white.”).  Zimmerman's family protested, saying Zimmerman was actually a minority since 
his mother was of Peruvian dissent.  See Renee Stutzman, George Zimmerman’s Father: My Son is Not a Racist, Did Not 
Confront Trayvon Martin, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:42 PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-
15/news/os-trayvon-martin-shooting-zimmerman-letter-20120315_1_robert-zimmerman-letter-unarmed-black-teenager 
(noting that George Zimmerman’s father delivered a one page letter to the Orlando Sentinel, stating that his son is 
Hispanic and grew up in a multi-racial family).  Subsequent media reports acknowledged Zimmerman’s mixed race 
background.  See Francescani, supra note 94.  
                                                     
Civil War era, Blacks had to carry proof that they were free men, not slaves.96  Many Blacks today 
are reminded of this dark history when they are pulled over by police and asked to show 
identification. 97   This history might explain in part why Martin may have taken offense at 
Zimmerman’s actions—and, if we believe Zimmerman’s account, why Martin might have thrown 
the first punch.98   
Martin may have also perceived Zimmerman’s actions as a challenge to his masculinity.  As 
Angela Harris has explained, men of color who lack power over others sometimes resort to hyper-
masculine shows of physical aggression to demonstrate their masculinity.99  Martin was not a 
wealthy African-American adult male.  He was an African-American male teenager from a family 
of modest means.100  Camille Gear-Rich explains that Martin’s resort to physical violence may have 
been a way for him to demonstrate his masculinity. 101 
The prosecution not only acquiesced in the judge’s decision to run a colorblind trial, they 
embraced a colorblind trial strategy.102  At the hearing on the pretrial motion on whether the 
prosecution could use the term “racial profiling” to describe Zimmerman’s actions the night of the 
shooting, prosecutor John Guy told Judge Nelson, “[Profiling] is not a racially charged term unless 
it’s made so, and we do not intend to make it a racially charged term.”103  The prosecution team 
was very careful not to call attention to race throughout the rest of the trial.  
The prosecution may have been worried that if they called attention to race, jurors would think 
they were “playing the race card.”  “Playing the race card” is a term of art used to accuse a person 
of lying when they claim to have suffered differential treatment on the basis of race.104 Someone 
96  See Bernie D. Jones, Southern Free Women of Color in the Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New 
Women’s Legal History”, 41 AKRON L. REV. 763, 779 (2008) (noting that Ohio’s Black Laws of 1804 & 1807 required 
any Black person traveling to Ohio to prove through a certificate of freedom that they were free and not a slave). 
97  Paul Butler, Walking While Black: Encounters With the Police on My Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 
23. 
98  At his trial, Zimmerman claimed that Martin threw the first punch.  Even though there was no evidence 
corroborating Zimmerman’s account of who started the physical confrontation, during closing arguments, the defense 
was permitted to show the jury an animated video of the events, which depicted Martin throwing the first punch.  Patrik 
Jonsson, Zimmerman Trial: For Jury, Anguished Task to Resolve Death of Trayvon Martin, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 
(July 12, 2013) http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0712/Zimmerman-trial-For-jury-anguished-task-to-
resolve-death-of-Trayvon-Martin (“An animated video shown by the defense showed Martin, in a hoodie, walking up to 
Zimmerman, and punching him.”).  
99  Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 785 (2000). 
100 Yamiche Alcindor, Trayvon Martin: Typical Teen or Troublemaker?, USA TODAY (December 11, 2012, 7:13 
PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/11/trayvon-martin-profile/1761373/ (noting that Trayvon 
Martin’s father was a Miami truck driver); Mary C. Curtis, What Chance Did Trayvon Martin, the ‘Suspect’ Have in 
Court?, WASH. POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/07/15/what-
chance-did-trayvon-martin-the-suspect-have-in-court/ (describing Martin as a “middle-class minor”); Daniel Trotta, 
Trayvon Martin: Before the World Heard the Cries, REUTERS (April 3, 2012, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-usa-florida-shooting-trayvon-idUSBRE8320UK20120403 (noting that 
Trayvon Martin’s father worked as a truck driver in Miami).  
101 Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon Martin, George 
Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (2014).  See also Harris, supra 
note 99.  
102 The prosecution embraced a colorblind strategy on the surface, but behind the scenes, they were very aware of 
race and gender dynamics.  During jury selection, the prosecution used six or seven of their ten peremptory challenges 
to strike White females from the jury, prompting a Batson objection from the defense.  The judge disallowed two of these 
challenges, essentially finding that the prosecution had impermissibly relied on race and/or gender in utilizing their 
peremptory challenges.  As I note in a forthcoming book chapter, apparently someone on the prosecution team thought 
race and gender mattered or they would not have tried so hard to keep White females from sitting on the jury.  See Lee, 
supra note 90. 
103 Roig-Franzia, supra note 91, at A1.  
104 Christopher A. Bracey, The Color of Our Future: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of the Race Card in American 
Culture, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 91 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING 
                                                     
who “plays the race card” is understood to be inappropriately claiming racial disadvantage.105  The 
race card accusation has been used so often by individuals who are hostile to discussions on race 
that many people today will not call attention to race out of fear of being accused of “playing the 
race card.”106   
The prosecution had reason to be worried that they would attract criticism if they called 
attention to race.  Some trial observers firmly believed the case had nothing to do with race.107 
Some thought it was unfair to prosecute Zimmerman and make him “pay for generations of racial 
inequities.”108  Others believed Zimmerman was prosecuted “to placate angry African-American 
voters and others who rallied to make the killing a cause.”109   
Defense attorney Mark O’Mara provided further support for the critics opposed to the 
prosecution of Zimmerman, repeatedly opining that if Zimmerman had been Black, “he never 
would have been charged with a crime.”110  Actually, studies suggest that if Zimmerman had been 
Black and had shot and killed a White male, it is very likely he would have been arrested, 
prosecuted, convicted, and possibly sentenced to death.111  Blacks who kill Whites are far more 
likely to be prosecuted and sentenced to death than Whites who kill Blacks.112   
Aware that members of the community viewed the prosecution of Zimmerman as unfair scape-
goating, the prosecution decided to try the case without referencing race—to take the colorblind 
high ground.  The problem is that by not calling attention to the possibility that Zimmerman thought 
Martin looked suspicious because of deeply entrenched stereotypes about young Black men as 
criminals, the prosecution encouraged jurors to see Zimmerman and Martin as just two young men 
who got into a fight that tragically, but understandably, ended in death.  By deliberately avoiding 
any discussion of race, they erased Trayvon Martin’s race from the trial even though race likely 
played a significant role in why Zimmerman thought Martin looked suspicious from the start and 
why the jury may have found Zimmerman’s account of what happened that night credible.113  
Trayvon Martin’s race, however, could not be completely eliminated from the jury’s 
consciousness.  Jurors needed only to look at the autopsy photos of Trayvon Martin or observe his 
parents in the courtroom to be aware of his race.  In deciding whether Zimmerman honestly and 
reasonably feared Martin, a necessary component of his self-defense claim, jurors quite possibly, 
even if subconsciously, considered Martin’s race, and made the implicit association between black 
males, criminality, and violence.   
ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE (2008)) (“The pejorative meaning we ascribe to the race card is sourced 
from our collective perception that those who play the race card are abusing the rhetoric and legacy of racism and racial 
injustice . . . .”). 
105 Id. 
106 For more on the “race card,” see RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS 
MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE (2008); Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and 
Susan Smith—Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 229 n.10 (1995); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond 
“Sellouts” and “Race Cards”: Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 773, 788–
93 (1997). 
107 See, e.g., Joshu Harris, The Real Reasons the Trayvon Martin Case Should Be a Criminal Justice Poster Child, 
61 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 46, 48 (2013) (opining that “the available evidence strongly suggests that race had little to 
do with the deadly confrontation”).  
108 See, e.g., Tom Foreman, Analysis: The Race Factor in George Zimmerman’s Trial, CNN (July 15, 2013, 9:10 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/14/justice/zimmerman-race-factor/. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See Kang et al., supra note 15.  See also text accompanying notes 14–15. 
112 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (finding that jurors imposed the death penalty in 22% of cases 
involving Black defendants and White victims, but did the same in only 3% of cases involving White defendants and 
Black victims).  See also supra notes 14–15. 
113 See Lee, supra note 74 at 1570–72 (discussing Implicit Association Test and shooter bias studies). 
                                                     
By ignoring race, prosecutors may have unwittingly exacerbated the effects of implicit bias.  
A substantial body of research suggests that ignoring race leads jurors to assess Black defendants 
more harshly than similarly situated White defendants, but these racially disparate results are 
reduced when race is made salient. 114  If prosecutors had confronted race head on by making race 
a salient feature of their trial strategy, they might have been able to convince the jury to see Martin 
in a more sympathetic light. 
 
B. Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law  
 
The second critique Carbado leveled at the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth 
Amendment was its failure to fully examine the ways in which the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence affected the everyday lives of persons of color.115  In contrast, much of 
the existing scholarship on the shooting of Trayvon Martin reflects concern about the problem of 
implicit racial bias and some scholarship is specifically focused on the impact of Stand Your 
Ground laws on persons of color.116  
In 2005, Florida amended its self-defense statute, which previously required an individual to 
retreat before using deadly force in self-defense if a safe retreat was known and available to the 
individual.117  Under Florida’s revised self-defense statute, dubbed Florida’s Stand Your Ground 
law, individuals in Florida no longer have to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense.118  
Even if a safe retreat is known and available, an individual who is attacked while in a place where 
he (or she) has a lawful right to be may use deadly force to repel the attacker.  An individual has 
no duty to retreat before using such force as long as “he or she reasonably believes it is necessary 
to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony.”119  The shooting of Trayvon Martin called attention to Florida’s 
Stand Your Ground law because the Sanford Police Department referred to this law as the reason 
why they did not arrest Zimmerman the night of the shooting.120   
While English common law required individuals to retreat to the wall before using deadly 
force in self-defense if a safe retreat was known and available,121 a no-duty-to-retreat rule has long 
114 Id. at 1586 (discussing race salience studies); Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Race, supra note 21, at 1027–28 (finding that presenting jurors with race relevant voir dire questions in cases involving 
interracial violence reduced racial bias in White jurors); Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 21, 
at 1367 (finding that in interracial domestic violence cases, White jurors were more likely to treat White and Black 
defendants the same if the defendant referred to himself as a White or Black man when speaking to his girlfriend than if 
he simply referred to himself as a man); Sommers & Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making, supra note 
21, at 600–03 (summarizing authors’ previous research on race salience); Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra 
note 21, at 202 (noting that “racial norms in society have shifted dramatically,” and that White jurors were more likely 
to treat White and Black defendants equally if a defense witness spoke about the White or Black defendant being the 
subject of racial slurs).  While the social science studies on race salience have focused on whether making race salient 
encourages jurors to treat similarly situated Black and White defendants the same way, it is likely that calling attention 
to race can encourage jurors to treat similarly situated Black and White victims the same way as well. 
115 Carbado, supra note 22, at 966. 
116 BLOOM, supra note 76 at 193–265, 279–93; Beety, supra note 74; Lee, supra note 72; Lawson, supra note 72; 
Richardson & Goff, supra note 72.   
117 Florida Legislation—The Controversy Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law—Fla. Stat. § 776.013 
(2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 353–54 (2005). 
118 FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2013). 
119 FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013). 
120 Hanna, supra note 81 (Letter from Norton N. Bonaparte, Jr., ICMA-CM, City Manager (Mar. 19, 2012) citing 
the immunity provision of Florida’s self-defense statute as support for its decision not to arrest Zimmerman).  See also 
Gray, supra note 87.  
121 Lydia Zbrzeznj, Florida's Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting Citizens to Arm Themselves and 
Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 231, 234–35 (2012). 
                                                     
been a part of American self-defense doctrine.122  In 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court approved of the 
no-duty-to-retreat rule, noting that “[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 
an uplifted knife.”123  Today, thirty-three states allow individuals to use deadly force in self-defense 
without requiring retreat.124  In these states, an individual can use deadly force in self-defense 
against another individual even if a safe retreat is known and available.  Seventeen states require 
retreat if a safe retreat is known and available.125  In these states, if a safe retreat is known and 
available to the defendant and he uses deadly force without retreating, he loses his right to act in 
self-defense.  Some states do not require retreat but allow the jury to consider whether a safe retreat 
was known and available in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need to 
act in self-defense.126  In these jurisdictions, if a safe retreat was known and available to the 
defendant, the jury may conclude that it was not reasonable for the defendant to believe he needed 
to use deadly force to protect himself from imminent death or serious bodily injury.127 
The Florida legislature went beyond simply eliminating the duty to retreat from its previous 
law of self-defense.  It also enacted a controversial immunity provision, which gives an individual 
who reasonably believes in the need to use deadly force in self-defense immunity from arrest and 
criminal prosecution.  Florida’s immunity provision provides: 
122 Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the 
Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule”, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 305 (1992). 
123 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).  
124 For a helpful chart with detailed information on stand your ground laws by state, see Tamara F. Lawson, Stand 
Your Ground Laws 50 State Table (March 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). ALA. CODE § 13A-
3-23(b) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-405(B) (2010); California v. 
Zuckerman, 132 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 347 (Colo. 2000); FLA. STAT. § 
776.013(3) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23.1 (2006); State v. McGreevey, 105 P. 1047, 1051 (Idaho 1909); People v. 
Hughes, 360 N.E.2d 1363, 1369–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5230 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.055(3) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
780.972 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(4) (2006); State v. Bingman, 745 P.2d 342, 348 (Mont. 1987); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 200.120(2) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (2011); State v. Horton, 258 P.2d 371, 373 (N.M. 1953); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3(a) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2011); State v. Sandoval, 156 P.3d 60, 64 (Or. 2007); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.3) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(C) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(2) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(c) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 
(West 2013); State v. Hatcher, 706 A.2d 429, 435 (Vt. 1997); Foote v. Commonwealth, 396 S.E.2d 851, 855 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Redmond, 78 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Wash. 2003); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-22 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 939.48 
(2011).  At the time this article was being written, the Ohio State legislature was considering legislation that would 
eliminate the duty to retreat.  Jackie Borchardt, Concealed Carry Bill with ‘Stand Your Ground’ Provision: How They 
Voted, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/03/concealed_carry_bill_with_stan.html (noting that the Ohio State 
House passed HB 203, eliminating the duty to retreat, which is pending in the Ohio State Senate).  
125 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607(b)(1)(A) (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT.  ANN. § 53a-19(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b) (West 2012); State v. Sedig, 16 N.W.2d 247, 
250 (Iowa 1944); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(2)(C)(3)(a) (2007); Redcross v. State, 708 A.2d 1154, 1157–58 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Edwards, 717 
N.W.2d 405, 413 (Minn. 2006); State v. Miller, 653 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1409(4)(b) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 
2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (2007); State v. Walker, 598 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Silvia, 836 A.2d 197, 200 (R.I. 2003); State v. Jackson, 681 S.E.2d 17, 21 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009); Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 
754, 760 (Wyo. 1995).  
126 Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) (holding that the law of the District of Colombia “does 
not impose a duty to retreat but does allow a failure to retreat, together with all the other circumstances, to be considered 
by the jury in determining if there was a case of true self-defense”); State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1999) (noting that under Wisconsin law, the ability to retreat “goes to the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
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127 See, e.g., Wenger, 594 N.W.2d at 471 (noting that “whether the opportunity to retreat was available may be a 
consideration regarding whether the defendant reasonably believed the force used was necessary to prevent or terminate 
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(1) A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is 
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for 
the use or threatened use of such force . . .  unless the person against whom force was 
used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the 
performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in 
accordance with any applicable law or the person using or threatening to use force knew 
or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer.  As used 
in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in 
custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.128 
 
Many commentators have opined that media attention on Florida’s Stand Your Ground law 
was misplaced since Zimmerman’s self-defense claim would have been the same in a non-Stand 
Your Ground state.  For example, conservative commentator Ann Coulter told the press, “[T]his . 
. . has nothing to do with ‘Stand Your Ground.’”129  Coulter explained that if Zimmerman was on 
the ground being beaten by Martin, there was no safe retreat available to him just before the 
shooting.130  Therefore, even in a jurisdiction that requires retreat if a safe retreat is known and 
available to the defendant, Zimmerman would have had the right to use deadly force in self-defense 
provided he met the other, usual requirements of the state’s self-defense law.  Moreover, 
Zimmerman did not claim immunity from prosecution as he could have under Florida’s immunity 
provision.131  
While Zimmerman did not claim immunity and arguably could not retreat while he was on the 
ground, Stand Your Ground nonetheless was a part of the Zimmerman case.  For one thing, the jury 
was instructed on Florida’s Stand Your Ground law.  They were specifically told: 
 
If George Zimmerman was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in 
any place where he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand 
his ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he reasonably believed 
that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another 
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.132 
 
Moreover, it is not clear that a safe retreat was not available to Zimmerman.  Perhaps no safe 
retreat was available to Zimmerman once he was on the ground with Martin on top of him, but 
Zimmerman may have had the opportunity to retreat before the encounter got physical.  
Additionally, even under Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, Zimmerman would have had a duty to 
retreat if he was the initial aggressor.133 
128 FLA. STAT. §776.032(1) (2013). 
129 Jeff Poor, Coulter Argues Trayvon Martin Controversy Has Nothing To Do With the ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law, THE DAILY 
CALLER (April 1, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/04/01/coulter-argues-trayvon-martin-controversy-has-nothing-to-do-
with-the-stand-your-ground-law/ (noting that Coulter opined, “The ‘Stand Your Ground’ law is only relevant if someone had the 
opportunity to retreat . . . In neither [the defense’s nor the prosecution’s] narrative is retreating an option. . . .  This is simple self-defense.”). 
130 Id. 
131 Richard Luscombe, George Zimmerman’s Lawyer Makes a Shocking Change to His Defense Strategy, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(May 6, 2013, 8:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/george-zimmerman-drops-stand-your-ground-2013-3. 
132 Jury Instructions at 12, Florida v. Zimmerman, No. 12-CF-1083-A (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2013). 
133 FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2014) (The justification for using force in self-defense is not available to one who:   
Initially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself, unless . . . [i]n good faith, the 
person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she 
desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.). 
What makes one an “initial aggressor” for purposes of self-defense is not very clear even in states that have 
attempted to define the term. 
                                                     
The Zimmerman case focused the nation’s attention on Stand Your Ground laws.  This 
scrutiny reveals that Stand Your Ground laws are not applied in an even-handed way.  Just as the 
race of the victim seems to affect outcomes in capital cases, the race of the victim seems to affect 
outcomes in Stand Your Ground cases.  A study of cases involving claims of self-defense in Florida 
after passage of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law is instructive.  The Tampa Bay Times studied 
192 cases involving Floridians charged with crimes of violence who claimed self-defense under 
Florida’s Stand Your Ground law and found that individuals who killed a Black person walked 73 
percent of the time, while those who killed a White person went free 59 percent of the time.134   
Similarly, an empirical study by John Roman of the Urban Institute found that in both Stand 
Your Ground and non-Stand Your Ground states, “[w]hite-on-black homicides [are] most likely to 
be ruled justified (11.4 percent), while black-on-white homicides are least likely to be ruled 
justified (1.2 percent).”135  When he focused just on Stand Your Ground states, Roman found that 
“controlling for all case attributes [other than race], the odds a white-on-black homicide [will be] 
found justified [in a Stand Your Ground jurisdiction] is 281 percent greater than the odds that a 
white-on-white homicide [will be] found justified.”136  In contrast, “a black-on-white homicide has 
barely half the odds of being ruled justifiable relative to [a] white-on-white homicide.”137  These 
studies indicate that Stand Your Ground laws are not being applied in a racially even-handed way.   
C. Most of the Racial Critiques of the Case Have Ignored Zimmerman’s Mixed Race Identity 
 
Carbado’s third critique was that the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth 
Amendment was under-inclusive because it focused primarily on Blacks and ignored other persons 
of color affected by race-based policing.138  A slightly different critique might be leveled at the 
existing commentary on the Zimmerman case, most of which has focused on the fact that Trayvon 
Martin was Black while ignoring or paying little attention to Zimmerman’s racial identity.  Initial 
news reports about the shooting either failed to mention Zimmerman’s race or referred to 
Zimmerman as White.139  Usually when a person’s race is not mentioned, it is because the person 
is White and the speaker assumes that the reader will understand this.140  Rarely is the race of the 
individual mentioned when the person in question is White because White is the default or assumed 
race.141 
When it became clear that the public thought Zimmerman had racially profiled Martin, 
Zimmerman’s father wrote a letter to the Orlando Sentinel, announcing that his son was not a racist 
and was himself an ethnic minority since his mother was from Peru.142  In declaring Zimmerman’s 
134 Susan Taylor Martin, Kris Hundley & Connie Humburg, Race Plays Complex Role in Florida’s ‘Stand Your 
Ground’ Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-plays-
complex-role-in-floridas-stand-your-ground-law/1233152.  
135 John K. Roman, Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary 
Homicide Report Data, URBAN INSTITUTE 6 (July 2013). 
136 Id. at 9. 
137 Id. (“[B]lack-on-black homicides have the same odds of being ruled justifiable as white-on-white homicides.”).  
See also Martin et al., supra note 134 (In keeping with the last observation, the Tampa Bay Times study found no bias in 
the way Black and White defendants in Florida are treated overall, perhaps because most crimes of violence are intra-
racial.  Whites who invoked Florida’s Stand Your Ground law were charged at about the same rate as Blacks.  Whites 
who went to trial were convicted at about the same rate as Blacks who went to trial.  Black homicide defendants went 
free 66 percent of the time compared to 61 percent of White defendants, a difference that could be attributed to the intra-
racial nature of most homicides.).  
138 Carbado, supra note 22, at 967. 
139 See Schneider, supra note 95 (“The neighborhood watch leader is white.”); Gamboa, supra note 95.  
140 See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 973 (1993).  
141 See id. at 973 n.86. 
142 Stutzman, supra note 95.  
                                                     
ethnic minority status as Hispanic and linking this status to the assertion that his son was not a 
racist, Zimmerman’s father was relying on an assumption that (non-Hispanic) White equals racist 
and minority equals non-racist.  It is a fallacy to assume that only Whites can be racist.  Whites do 
not hold a monopoly on racial bias against Blacks.  People of all races and ethnicities can be and 
often are racially biased in favor of Whites and against Blacks.143  As Tanya Hernandez points out, 
“Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a pervasive and historically entrenched fact of life in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.”
144   Similarly, Jerry Kang has noted that “Asian Americans 
generally have implicit biases against African Americans that are almost as strong as those held by 
Whites.”145  The fact that Zimmerman was himself of mixed race identity and thus an ethnic 
minority therefore does not mean he could not engage in racial stereotyping.  Zimmerman could 
have and most likely did rely on racial assumptions when he saw Martin and thought Martin looked 
suspicious.  Any one of us, myself included, could have had similar thoughts and beliefs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have come a long way from the days when it was risky business to write about race.  
Nonetheless, the deeply entrenched belief that it is best to ignore race and racial difference—the 
belief in colorblindness as an ideal—along with the specter of being accused of playing the race 
card continues to hinder open race talk.  From Justice O’Connor’s 1991 opinion in Florida v. 
Bostick to George Zimmerman’s 2013 murder trial, we can see the ideal of colorblindness at work.  
Being blind to race, however, can prevent the gears of the criminal justice system from working 
the way they should.  If we truly want to get beyond race, we need to stop erasing race from the 
discussion.    
 
 
143 Justin, D. Levinson, Danielle M. Young & Laurie A. Rudman, Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, 
in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9, 19–24 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). 
144. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the “Diversity” Defense, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259, 268 (2007).   
145 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1538 (2005). 
                                                     
